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ABSTRACT
Recent research has demonstrated that the way in which interviewers reveal information/evidence to 
interviewees/suspects can produce noticeable differences between truthful and deceptive verbal 
statements. However, very little of this research has involved adolescents. In the present study, 12 to 14 
year old adolescents were asked to commit (n  = 26) or not to commit (n  = 26) a mock crime and at 
interview to deny involvement in this crime. Prior to interview some information about each adolescent’s 
behaviour was made available to the interviewer but this was not enough to enable determination of 
whether he or she had committed the crime. The interviewer revealed such information either at the 
beginning of the interview (the ‘traditional method’), at the end of the interview (as pioneered by the ‘SUE’ 
technique), or gradually. The interviews were analysed for interviewees’ ‘evidence omissions’ and 
‘statement-evidence contradictions’. As predicted, liars omitted more crime-related information/details 
and their statements were significantly more inconsistent with the information/evidence known to/
disclosed by the interviewer. The timing of the interviewer’s evidence revelation had a significant effect on 
liars’ mentioning during their free recall of some of this information and on the total number of details 
mentioned in free recall.
© 2013 Colegio Oficial de Psicólogos de Madrid. All rights reserved. 
La entrevista a adolescentes sospechosos: ¿cuándo revelar información 
incriminatoria?
RESUMEN
Investigaciones recientes han demostrado que la forma en que los entrevistadores revelan información/
pruebas a los entrevistados/sospechosos puede producir diferencias considerables entre declaraciones ora-
les verdaderas y falsas. Sin embargo, muy poca investigación se ha centrado en adolescentes. En este estu-
dio se pidió a adolescentes de 12 a 14 años que cometieran (n = 26) o no cometieran (n = 26) un delito en 
un contexto de simulación y que negaran en una entrevista la participación en dicho delito. Previamente a 
la entrevista se le proporcionó al entrevistador cierta información sobre la conducta de cada adolescente, 
pero no era suficiente para establecer si había cometido el delito. El entrevistador revelaba dicha informa-
ción bien al inicio de la entrevista (‘método tradicional’), bien al final (como establece la técnica SUE) o 
gradualmente. En las entrevistas se analizó la ‘omisión de pruebas’ y las ‘contradicciones en la declaración’. 
En consonancia con las predicciones, los mentirosos omitían más información/detalles relacionados con el 
delito y sus declaraciones eran significativamente más incongruentes con la información/pruebas conoci-
das/reveladas por el entrevistador. La dosificación temporal con la que el entrevistador revelaba las pruebas 
tuvo un efecto significativo en la declaración de los mentirosos durante el recuerdo libre de la información 
y en el número total de detalles mencionados en el recuerdo libre.
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Liars and truth-tellers usually share the same goal of wanting to 
be perceived as a truth-teller. They engage in self-regulatory 
strategies whereby they attempt to control their behaviour to create 
an impression that they are telling the truth (Granhag & Hartwig, 
2008). However, a recent evolving idea is that liars may differ from 
truth-tellers in the actual strategies they employ when attempting to 
be perceived as innocent (Clemens et al., 2010).
In an interrogative situation, guilty suspects must decide what 
information to avoid, deny and admit (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). It 
is therefore likely that they may engage in a high level of ‘decision 
control’ (Fiske & Taylor, 2008) by planning plausible statements that 
illustrate their innocence. For example, in a situation whereby the 
suspect knows the interviewer has particular evidence against them, 
the suspect may admit to this but by giving an innocent explanation 
(e.g., “My fingerprints were on the knife because I picked it up to 
move it to see if she was still alive”). However, when the suspect is 
unaware of what evidence the interviewer has against him/her, he/
she may merely deny or avoid involvement in the event (Granhag & 
Hartwig, 2008) because any information that they do provide might 
be inconsistent with the evidence the interviewer may have against 
them.
However, truth-tellers are less likely to perceive such ‘interviewer-
known’ information as a threat. Indeed, it is this information that 
should correspond with their truthful account, thus revealing them 
to be telling the truth. In line with this, truth-tellers often voluntarily 
disclose such information (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007), 
speak for longer (Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Kronkvist, 2006) 
and provide extensive details (Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2010). Given 
that innocent and guilty suspects experience these rather different 
psychological processes, it may be possible to amplify these 
differences to elicit cues to detect deceit.
Evidence based approaches
Often, in an interrogative situation lie-catchers will have available 
to them items/pieces of information that incriminates a suspect. 
Traditional police interviews commonly involved presenting all such 
evidence at/near the beginning of the interview (Yeschke, 1997). 
However, disclosing all such evidence to a suspect before they have 
given their version of events allows the suspect to become aware of 
information that the lie-catcher has. On the other hand, disclosing 
the evidence after the suspect has given her/his version of events 
may well be a useful way to assess contradictions/inconsistencies 
between the suspect’s statement and this evidence/information.
Strategic Use of Evidence
One approach, known as the strategic use of evidence (SUE) 
technique, initially attempted to do this by disclosing the relevant 
three pieces of information/evidence towards the very end of an 
interview (Hartwig et al., 2006). These authors conducted in Sweden 
a pioneering study in which (very new) police recruits were asked to 
interview (mock) suspects about an event that was not that complex. 
Those recruits who interviewed using the SUE approach produced an 
overall accuracy rate of 85.4% (truth accuracy 85%; lie accuracy 
85.7%) compared to an overall accuracy rate of 56.1% (truth accuracy 
57.1%; lie accuracy 55%) obtained by recruits who merely used their 
‘lay’ skills of interviewing. When late disclosure was compared with 
early revelation, liars’ verbal behaviour was found to be significantly 
more inconsistent with the evidence. Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, 
and Vrij (2005) found that video recordings of use of the SUE 
approach yielded above chance detection of liars (67.6%), but less so 
of truth-tellers (53.6%). More recently, Jordan, Hartwig, Wallace, 
Dawson, and Xhihani (2012) again found (with adults) that late 
disclosure resulted in more inconsistency from liars than did early 
revelation.
A third alternative way of revealing the (possibly) incriminating 
information/evidence is to do so gradually (i.e., one piece at a time). 
For example, two recent studies in England explored whether this 
could increase rates of deception/truth detection with regard to 
complex events that are typical of some types of crimes (e.g., 
terrorism). They created an interactive game whereby participants 
(four per game) were incentivised to complete a series of tasks 
before the other players did. The task of a builder was to build a 
section of the Olympic stadium, whereas the task of a terrorist was 
to build but also later blow up the stadium. Participants were 
subsequently interviewed and several pieces/items of information/ 
evidence against them were disclosed early, late or gradually. In a 
study (Dando, Bull, Ormerod, and Sandham, in press), a random 
selection of these interviews was shown to experienced police 
officers who were asked to make veracity judgements about each of 
the interviewees. Gradual disclosure resulted in the best veracity 
judgements. Post interview questionnaires revealed that the 
terrorists reported gradual revelation to be the most cognitively 
demanding. Despite the promising advances of the evidence usage 
approaches very little is known about whether such strategies can be 
used with children. In another study (Dando & Bull, 2011) very 
experienced detectives were each trained to be able to reveal the 
several pieces of information/evidence early or late or gradually. 
Their accuracy in deciding at the end of the interview whether 
interviewees had been lying or truthful was significantly better in 
the gradual interviews.
Deception detection in children
Clemens et al. (2010) were the first to explore whether the late/
SUE approach could facilitate lie detection regarding 12 to 14 year 
old children who participated in an event. The children were 
subsequently interviewed and some evidence against them was 
disclosed at the beginning or towards the end (SUE) of the interview. 
When the SUE approach was employed, guilty children were less 
likely to mention in their free recall the incriminating evidence. 
When asked questions about this, the liars’ statements tended to be 
inconsistent with the evidence. When the evidence was disclosed at 
the beginning of the interview, observer accuracy rate was at chance 
level (55%), but when the SUE approach was used this exceeded 
chance level (63%). Observers were more accurate at detecting truths 
(70%) than lies (48%) when the SUE was employed. 
Cognitive development
In order to deceive, one must have insight into mental states. This 
involves recognising that others have knowledge, beliefs and 
intentions that may differ from one’s own. This ‘Theory of Mind’ 
typically develops around the age of three and by beginning of 
adolescence most children have a firm grasp of other people’s mental 
states. For example, Talwar, Gordon, and Lee (2007) gave 6 to 12 year 
old children the opportunity to cheat in a trivia game where the 
answers to each question were written on the back of each card. The 
researchers anticipated that when asked if they cheated, older 
children who had cheated would give an answer similar to a ‘non-
peeker’, and purposely get the question wrong in order to appear as 
a truth-teller. Indeed, older children were more likely to show 
knowledge of such second-order beliefs. Furthermore, older children 
maintained consistency in their verbal deception. Executive 
functioning skills such as resisting automatic responses (inhibitory 
control) and maintaining rules in working memory are also strongly 
related to deception (Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998).
Shing, Lindenberger, Diamond, Li, and Davidson (2010) explored 
the executive functioning ability of a group of 4 to 15 year olds. 
Children took part in various tasks designed to assess inhibitory 
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were better at holding information in their mind whilst being able to 
suppress irrelevant or automatic behaviours, than younger children.
Collectively these findings suggest that by the age of 12 children 
clearly know that others’ beliefs and intentions differ from their 
own. Furthermore, given their well-developed executive functioning 
skills, they appear to have the cognitive ability when required to 
successfully deceive others.
The current research
The current research attempts to explore whether gradual and 
late disclosure of evidence could produce differences in young 
adolescents’ truthful and deceptive statements. No study has yet 
directly compared such approaches regarding children. This current 
study will partly replicate the method of Clemens et al. (2010). Based 
on the theory and research outlined above, it is possible to make a 
number of predictions:
(i)      liars’ free recall will consist of fewer details about the event 
compared with truth-tellers;
(ii)      liars will omit more incriminating evidence compared with 
truth-tellers;
(iii)   liars’ statements will be more inconsistent with the evidence;
(iv)    late and gradual revelation will increase such differences 
between liars and truth-tellers, compared to early.
Method
Participants
The participants were 54 children from a school (26 boys and 28 
girls), whose mean age was 13.2 years (range = 12.0 to 14.9, SEM = 
0.12). A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) found that the ages of 
the three experimental groups were not significantly different, F(2, 
51) = 2.00, p = .15.
Design
Participants were randomly assigned either to the early disclosure, 
late disclosure, or gradual disclosure interview. The dependent 
variables were (i) the extent to which the child mentioned the 
incriminating evidence during the free recall phase, (ii) whether the 
child’s statement was consistent with this incriminating evidence 
during the questioning phase, (iii) the amount of detail provided by 
participants in the free recall phase, and (iv) the amount of planning 
for the interview that the participants reported.
Materials and Procedure
The children were informed they would be taking part in a 
psychological study. Each child was randomly allocated to one of two 
levels of the independent variable (liar or truth-teller). Those 
allocated to the truth-teller condition were given a piece of paper 
with the letter ‘A’ on it, and those allocated to the liar condition were 
given a piece of paper with the letter ‘B’ on it. All children were 
instructed to write their initials on this piece of paper. 
Children allocated to the truth-teller condition (n  = 27) were 
asked to each post their piece of paper into the box marked ‘A’, 
which was a short distance away from their classroom in the school’s 
reception area. The top of this box was covered by a briefcase, and so 
all of the children had to move this in order to be able to post their 
piece of paper into the box. The briefcase which was placed on top of 
the box marked ‘A’ was locked, and so it was not possible for children 
to look inside the briefcase. This ensured that children in the truthful 
condition would not look inside the briefcase.
The children allocated to the deceptive condition (n = 27) were 
asked to each post their piece of paper into a similar box marked ‘B’. 
The top of this box was also covered by a briefcase, and so all of these 
children had to move this in order to post their piece of paper into 
the box. Additionally, these children were also asked to look inside 
the briefcase, which was not locked and could be opened.
Labelling each piece of paper as A or B allowed us to know for sure 
whether each child had posted their piece of paper into the correct 
box, which they all did.
The participants were 12 to 14 year olds and therefore consent 
had to be given by parents. After the school had given permission for 
the study to be conducted, parents/guardians were given consent 
forms, asking permission for their child to participate in the study. 
Only those children who had been given permission from their 
parent/guardian to participate were invited to participate in the 
study, and only those children who consented took part. Given that 
the parent or guardian consented to their child participating in the 
study, debrief forms were sent to the parent/guardian. Nonetheless, 
the children were still debriefed after the study by informing them 
what the study was about.
Pre-interview instructions
After taking part in the above event, all children were told that the 
experimenters knew that some of the children had opened the 
briefcase and looked inside it. However, the children were told that 
the researchers did not know whether each child was guilty or 
innocent. Children were told that they would now be interviewed 
about their behaviour in the event. The children were told that their 
answers would be audio-recorded so that their responses could be 
analysed afterwards. All children were given three minutes to 
prepare for the interview.
The interviews
Each interview was conducted by the same interviewer who 
followed a predetermined interview script. The interviewer did 
not know which children were truth-tellers and which were liars. 
Three different types of interviews were conducted (see below for 
further details): early, late, and gradual disclosure. All of the 
interviews comprised the same five phases, as recommended by 
the ‘PEACE approach’ used nationally by the police in England 
(Milne & Bull, 1999): introduction, explain, free recall, questioning, 
and closure.
Early disclosure 
All interviews began with an introduction phase, whereby the 
interviewer introduced himself. He then asked the child whether 
she/he confessed to opening the briefcase and looking inside it (none 
did so). Next, in the explain phase, the interviewer disclosed early 
two pieces of information. Firstly, the child was told that a witness 
had seen her/him in the reception area of the school, the same time 
that the briefcase had been there. Secondly, the interviewee was told 
that their fingerprints had been found on the briefcase. For the truth-
tellers (who could not open the briefcase) these two pieces would 
not be considered by them to be problematic because they had been 
asked to touch the briefcase. However, the liars might consider them 
to be problematic/incriminating. Then, in the free recall phase, the 
child was asked to give her/his own version of what happened in as 
much detail as possible. After this phase, the interviewer once again 
mentioned to the child the two pieces of incriminating evidence and 
asked separate specific questions whereby the interviewee was asked 
to make a comment regarding each piece of evidence. Then the child 
was once again asked whether she/he admitted to opening up the 
briefcase and looking inside it. The interview finished with a closure 
phase, whereby the interviewee was thanked for their participation 
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Late disclosure 
The introduction and explain phases were the same as described 
above for the early condition. However, these interviewees gave their 
free recall of what happened before the incriminating evidence was 
revealed to them. Subsequently, during the questioning phase, both 
pieces of evidence were together disclosed for the first time, and the 
child was then asked to make a comment regarding each piece of 
evidence. The child was once again asked whether they admitted to 
opening up the briefcase and looking inside it. The interview then 
finished with the closure phase.
Gradual disclosure 
The introduction and explain and free recall phases were the 
same as described for the late condition. However during the 
questioning phase, each piece of evidence was disclosed separately. 
After the first piece of evidence was revealed to the interviewee, 
they were asked to make a comment regarding this. Subsequently, 
the second piece of evidence was revealed and they were asked to 
make a comment regarding this. The interviewee was once again 
asked whether they admitted to opening up the briefcase and 
looking inside it. The interview then finished with the closure 
phase.
The consistency of the interviewer was assessed by randomly 
dividing the interviews for each condition into two groups and 
finding no significant differences for statement-evidence consistency 
score, omission of evidence or details.
Post-interview questionnaire
After each child was interviewed, they were asked to fill out a 
questionnaire regarding their age and gender. Each child was also 
asked to indicate whether they were given a piece of paper with an 
‘A’ or a ‘B’ written on it. (This ensured that the researchers were 
aware of the veracity of the child. This was verified against their 
initials that were written on the piece of paper that they posted.) 
After the child completed the questionnaire they were fully debriefed 
and thanked for their participation.
Coding of the interviews
In the free recall phase, the extent to which the child failed to 
mention the two pieces of evidence was recorded. Interviewee’s 
scores could range from 0 to 2, thus a score of 2 indicated that the 
child failed to mention both pieces of evidence. For the questioning 
phase, the extent to which the child’s statement was inconsistent 
with each piece of evidence was coded. Scores could range from 1 to 
3. Thus, if the child’s statement was perfectly consistent with a piece 
of evidence, the score was 1. If the child’s statement was neither 
consistent nor inconsistent with a piece of evidence, the score was 2. 
If the child’s statement was inconsistent with a piece of evidence, the 
score was 3. After giving the child a score for each piece of evidence, 
the average of these two scores provided her/his statement-evidence 
inconsistency score. (This is similar to the procedure used by Clemens 
et al., 2010).
Also the number of event-relevant details mentioned by 
interviewees in their free recall was coded as being either visual, 
auditory, spatial or location details. This is similar to the procedure 
used by Vrij et al. (2010).
Results
First, the findings will be presented with regard to the differences 
between liars and truth-tellers after which the effects of interview 
type will be presented.
Liars versus truth-tellers
In the free recall phase of the interviews the omission of crime 
related information made by liars and truth-tellers was compared 
using an independent samples t-test (a Levene’s test showed that 
equal variances could be assumed, F = 0.03, p = .88) which revealed 
that liars (M  = 1.00, SD = 0.73) omitted significantly, and with 
moderate effect size, more crime-related information than did truth-
tellers (M = 0.56, SD = 0.58), t(52) = 2.47, p < .05, Cohen’s d = 0.67. For 
the liars’ and truth-tellers’ statement-evidence consistency scores in 
the questioning phase another t-test (Levene’s test showed that 
equal variances could be assumed, F = 0.17, p = .20) found that liars’ 
statements (M = 2.11, SD = 0.47) were significantly, and with a large 
effect size, more inconsistent with the evidence than were truth-
tellers’ statements (M = 1.63, SD = 0.51), t(52) = 3.61, p < .001, Cohen’s 
d = 0.98.
In the light of these significant differences, to determine whether 
it was possible to predict veracity on the basis of the number of 
evidence related omissions and statement-evidence inconsistencies, 
a logistic regression was performed (see Table 1 below). The outcome 
variable was the veracity of the child (liar/truth-teller), and the 
predictor variables were the free recall omission of evidence item 1 
(i.e., not mentioning the witness), the free recall omission of evidence 
item 2 (i.e., not mentioning touching/fingerprints on the briefcase), 
and the questioning phase evidence-statement inconsistency score 
for evidence item 1 and for item 2. These variables were entered into 
the regression using a stepwise approach. The omission of evidence 
1 and evidence-statement inconsistency score for evidence 1 were 
jointly entered at the first stage, producing a good model of fit as 
assessed by the Hosmer and Lemeshow test, χ2(3, N = 54) = 2.86, p = 
.42. This model was significantly better than a constant-model 
containing only the intercept, but no other predictor variables, 
χ2(1, N = 54) = 8.93, p < .01. The omission of evidence 1 and evidence-
statement inconsistency score for evidence 1 lead to 59.3% correct 
classifications of liars, and 77.8% correct classifications of truth-
tellers (68.5% classification overall). In the second step of the logistic 
regression, the omission of evidence 2 and evidence-statement 
inconsistency score for evidence 2 were jointly entered, producing a 
good model of fit as assessed by the Hosmer and Lemeshow test, 
χ2(8, N = 54) = 7.97, p = .44. This model was significantly better than 
a constant-model containing only the intercept, but no other 
predictor variables, χ2(1, N = 54) = 26.41, p < .01. The omission of 
evidence 2 and evidence-statement inconsistency score for evidence 
2 lead to 88.9% correct classifications of liars, and 74.1% correct 
classifications of truth-tellers (81.5% overall classification).
Interview type
The omission of evidence 1 and 2 and the statement evidence 
inconsistency scores for evidence 1 and 2 were then used as 
Table 1
Logistic regression as function of not mentioning the evidence and being 
inconsistent with the evidence in the child suspects’ statements in predicting 
veracity (liar or truth-teller)
Variable B SE of B Wald Exp (B) 95% CI (z-ratio) 
for Exp (B)
SpecificQ_1 -1.34 702 3.639 0.26   0.66-1.04
FreeR_1  1.04 0.85 1.503 2.83 0.53-14.95
FreeR_2 -1.61 0.73 4.88* 0.20  0.05-0.83
SpecificQ_2 -1.63 0.68 5.70* 0.20  0.05-0.74
Note. SpecificQ_1 = questioning phase evidence-statement inconsistency for 
evidence item 1, SpecificQ_2 = questioning phase evidence-statement inconsistency 
for evidence item 2, FreeR_1 = mentioning in free recall evidence item 1, FreeR_2 = 
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dependent variables in a 2 x 3 Multivariate Analysis of Variance 
(MANOVA) with Veracity (liar or truth-teller) and Interview Type 
(early, late, gradual) as independent variables. The Veracity main 
effect was significant, Pillai’s Trace = 0.47, F(45) = 10.14, p < .001, np
2 = 
.474..At a univariate level, the Veracity main effect revealed three 
significant findings (see Table 2). Liars more often excluded evidence 
2 in the free recall phase of the interview than truth-tellers. In 
addition, liars’ statements were more inconsistent with both 
evidence 1 and evidence 2 during the questioning phase, than were 
truth-tellers’.
Then, for liars a MANOVA was performed with the three interview 
types as the independent variable and the dependent variables of 
omission of evidence 2, inconsistency evidence 1, and inconsistency 
evidence 2. The effect of interview type was significant, Pillai’s Trace 
= 0.51, F(6, 46) = 2.62, p < .05. np
2 = .255. At the univariate level this 
was only significant regarding the omission of evidence 2, F(2, 24) = 
7.00, p < .01, np
2 = .368. As for counterbalancing type I and II errors, 
least significant difference (LSD) post-hoc tests were performed, 
showing that liars less often omitted evidence 2 (during the free 
recall phase of the interview) in the early revelation interviews than 
in the late (p < .05) or gradual revelation interviews (p < .001).
For truth-tellers a MANOVA showed no effects of interview type 
on evidence omission or on inconsistency, which is similar to the 
findings of Hartwig et al. (2006).
Details mentioned by interviewees
In order to examine the number of details interviewees mentioned 
during the free recall phase, a 2 (Veracity: liar vs. truth-teller) x 3 
(Interview Type: early, late, gradual) ANOVA was conducted. The 
veracity main effect was significant, F(1, 48) = 24.67, p < .001, np
2 = 
.339. The interaction also was significant, F(1, 48) = 3.91, p < .05, np
2 = 
.140, indicating that whereas there was very little difference between 
liars and truth-tellers in the early revelation interviews and a 
somewhat larger such difference in the gradual interviews, it was the 
late interviews that produced the largest difference in total details 
between truth-tellers and liars (see Figure 1).
Discussion
The first prediction that liars’ free recall would consist of fewer 
event details was supported, as was the hypothesis that liars would 
omit more incriminating evidence than truth-tellers. Furthermore, it 
was also found, as predicted, that liars’ statements were more 
inconsistent with the evidence. This omission of crime-relevant 
information and statement-evidence inconsistency was found to be 
diagnostic of deception. One’s fingerprints being on the briefcase 
(evidence 2) may be more incriminating than merely being seen at 
the location by a witness at the time the event occurred (evidence 1). 
Whether or not guilty suspects utilise self-regulatory strategies such 
as decision control (Fiske & Taylor, 2008) may well depend on how 
incriminating they view the pieces of information/evidence to be.
It was also hypothesised that both the late and gradual 
revelation by the interviewer compared to the early could create 
difficulties for the liars. This hypothesis was also supported in 
that for liars late and gradual revelation were associated with 
more statement-evidence inconsistency for evidence items 1 and 
2, and a more omission of evidence 2, though at the univariate 
level this effect remained significant only for the omission of 
evidence 2 (which the regression analysis found predictive of 
lying). Presenting the evidence/information to interviewees after 
they have given their account limits the opportunity for liars to 
incorporate such information into their account. The two studies 
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Figure 1. Total number of details included in the free recall phase as a function of Veracity X Interview Type.
Table 2 
Omission of evidence and statement-evidence inconsistency as a function of 
Veracity: significant findings
Liar Truth-teller
M SE M SE F(5, 48) np
2
Omission of evidence 1 0.37 0.10 0.33 0.10  0.08 .002
Omission of evidence 2 0.70 0.80 0.22 0.80 18.27** .276
Inconsistency evidence 1 1.96 0.12 1.48 0.12  8.35*  .148
Inconsistency evidence 2 2.33 0.11 1.63 0.11 19.78** .276
Note. * p < .05; **p < .01.146  J. Lingwood and R. Bull / The European Journal of Psychology Applied to Legal Context 5 (2013) 141-146
by Dando and colleagues (Dando & Bull, 2011; Dando et al., in 
press) found that gradual revelation was particularly cognitively 
taxing for the liars and significantly enhanced interviewers’ and 
observers’ veracity judgments in comparison with early or late 
disclosure. In their studies the interviewers revealed several 
pieces of evidence (five in total) rather than just two as in the 
current study, which may not have been a sufficient amount of 
evidence to fully reap the benefits of gradual revelation. However, 
and understandably, the school did not want each child’s interview 
to be long –in the present study most interviews did not last 
longer than the anticipated ten minutes. Future research with 
child participants would probably benefit from having more than 
two items of information/evidence to reveal, which not only 
might increase ecological validity but also may enhance the effect 
of gradual revelation. Nevertheless, the present study evidenced 
that (whenever circumstances allow) the traditional method of 
early revelation should be avoided.
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